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Regional fragmentation of the European Rim means that the
EU must pursue policies to promote greater regional
integration and cooperation.
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How can the European Union encourage trade with its immediate neighbours? Peter
Havlik explores the EU’s relationship with the ‘European Rim’, an area with a population
nearly as great as that of the EU.  He writes that in order to increase growth by taking
advantage of EU markets, Europe’s neighbours must expand their export capacities and
increase their competitiveness. The EU must, in turn, adapt the current approach to its
periphery by promoting intra-regional cooperation and reducing regional barriers to trade
and cooperation. 
The countries that belong to the ‘European Rim’ (shown in Figure 1, below) are extremely diverse. In
economic terms, most of  them are small (except Egypt, Russia and Ukraine) and have less-developed,
economies (the exceptions being members of  the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) or the
European Economic Area (EEA) – Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, which are among the most
af f luent countries in the world – and Israel, whose GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) is
close to the EU average). On the other hand, a number of  Eastern Rim countries (e.g. Armenia, Georgia,
Moldova), as well as several Middle East and North Af rican (MENA) countries (e.g. Morocco, Jordan and
Syria), are f airly poor, with estimated GDP per capita at PPP amounting to less than 20 per cent of  the
EU average.
Figure 1 – The European Rim
Source: European Rim Policy and Investment Council 
However, in terms of  population, the total of  the Rim countries is close to that of  the EU (87 per cent of
the EU: 435 million and 501 million inhabitants, respectively), while in terms of  total GDP at exchange
rates, the overall Rim economy is rather small (23 per cent of  the EU: EUR 2,790 billion and 12,260 billion,
respectively). Even at PPPs, the estimated aggregate GDP of  the Rim countries represents just about a
third of  the EU’s – still a huge market, especially when its considerable growth potential is taken into
account. The individual dimensions of  the European Rim all have important implications f or EU policies
towards the region(s), f or EU institutional relations with individual Rim countries and f or Rim countries
themselves – including their competit iveness.
The EU’s institutional relations towards the Rim are now aimed essentially at the conclusion of  bilateral
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) and mobility partnerships with all the
countries that are able and willing. The key question now, is whether this approach is adequate (or even
appropriate) f or such a diverse group of  countries and societies. Most of  the reviewed literature
suggests that it is not. Apart f rom policies aimed at bilateral trade liberalisation and measures to support
the investment climate in the countries concerned, the EU should also promote regional integration and
intra-regional cooperation. These init iatives would be helpf ul especially in the Eastern and Southern
parts of  the Rim, where regional f ragmentation is particularly detrimental.
The economic growth of  most Rim countries and their progress in catching up (if  any) have been the
result not of  increased exports, but in most cases (apart f rom energy exporters and tourist
destinations) have originated with the expansion of  domestic demand; and this has f requently been
f inanced f rom transf ers (aid and remittances to resource-poor countries). The growth of  industry in the
majority of  Rim countries, in particular in the Southern cluster, is lagging behind the growth of  GDP, as
illustrated in Figure 2. The recent experience of  Southeast Europe shows that the pre-crisis neglect in
building up a viable trade sector and suf f iciently competit ive export capacities has aggravated the crisis.
Policies leading to expansion of  the export sector will have to take priority, and the use of  dif f erent
policy instruments (labour market, investment promotion and institutional development) will have to be
strengthened.
Figure 2 Competit iveness of the Rim: growth of industry and GDP, 2000–10
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The Rim’s competit iveness is generally low (except f or the above-mentioned exceptions in the advanced
North), and this is ref lected among other things, in the low intensity of  manuf acturing exports and low
f oreign direct investment (FDI) inf lows. The many reasons f or this situation are related to economic
backwardness in general, low employment skills and also the poor business climate that particularly
af f ects small and medium enterprises. As Figure 3 shows, the Eastern part of  the Rim has been doing
somewhat better in this respect than both the Western Balkans and the MENA region in a number of
business-relevant areas (such as access to f inance, the use of  f oreign technology, labour market
regulations and workers’ skills).
Figure 3 – Competit iveness of the Rim: ease of doing business, employment skills and
manufacturing exports per capita
Note: expo rt s  per capit a  in lo garit hms; pro po rt io nal t o  bubbles
Source: wiiw.
The Rim countries are relatively minor trading partners f or the EU and do not pose any serious challenge
to EU competit iveness. However, the trade asymmetry – the EU being usually the main trading partner of
the Rim countries – is challenging, not least f or the f ormulation of  EU policies, since any bilateral deal
has much greater consequences f or the Rim than f or the EU. Trade asymmetry and the underutilisation
of  the trade potential provided by the geographical proximity of  the Rim should be overcome. In
particular, the proximity of  the huge EU market can be regarded as the Rim’s locational competit ive
advantage – thus f ar largely unexploited. Each of  the sub-regions within the European Rim is a f ocus
area in terms of  trade f lows f or at least one sub-region of  the EU. The varying regional specialisation
(and interests) of  individual EU countries represents another challenge f or the f ormulation of  unif orm
and ef f ective EU policies towards the Rim.
Limited diversif ication of  the Rim’s exports (except f or in the advanced North) is one of  the greatest
stumbling-blocks to the region’s competit iveness. Attempts to improve the international competit iveness
of  the Rim countries – such as product and labour market ref orms, but also liberalisation ef f orts and
improvements in the business climate in general – may not have the desired posit ive ef f ects. This is
because these economies still generally lack both the industrial capacity and the necessary structural
f lexibility to respond successf ully to external competit ive pressures. These drawbacks result in high
adjustment costs and low gains f rom liberalisation in terms of  an increased emergence of  new f irms and
new export products. This interpretation of  the competit ive situation of  the majority of  the European Rim
countries (again except f or the North) corresponds to the results f rom an earlier trade simulation
exercise, which predicts signif icant short- term output losses in the European Rim countries in the
bilateral liberalisation scenario.
A major impediment to the Rim’s competit iveness is its regional f ragmentation. Even within the three sub-
regions there are many barriers to trade and business in general (the persisting f rozen or open conf licts
are obviously not helpf ul either). Numerous trade barriers exist in both the Eastern and Southern parts
of  the Rim. In the Southern part of  the Rim, the limited intra-regional integration is viewed as the key
obstacle to FDI, trade diversif ication and growth. In the Eastern part of  the Rim, attempts at a revival of
Russian- led regional integration (the Russia–Belarus–Kazakhstan customs union) have not been
encouraged by the EU.
The continuing bilateral ‘hub-and-spoke trade arrangements’ between the EU and the Rim resemble the
pre-accession arrangements which the EU concluded with accession countries f rom Central and Eastern
Europe during the 1990s. However, without the proper ‘membership anchor ’, such arrangements are
probably not suf f icient to f oster ref orms, regional integration and a sustainable development on the Rim.
Theref ore, the EU needs a more ambitious design f or its trade agreements with neighbourhood
countries.
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